Effort dynamics in a fisheries bioeconomic model: A vessel level approach through Game Theory
Gorka Merino, Francesc Maynou and Antonio García-Olivares

Red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1816) is one of the most important resources for the bottom-trawl fleets in the northwestern Mediterranean, in terms of both landings and economic value. A simple bioeconomic model introducing Game Theory for the prediction of effort dynamics at vessel level is proposed. The game is performed by the twelve vessels exploiting red shrimp in Blanes. Within the game, two solutions are performed: non-cooperation and cooperation. The first is proposed as a realistic method for the prediction of individual effort strategies and the second is used to illustrate the potential profitability of the analysed fishery. The effort strategy for each vessel is the number of fishing days per year and their objective is profit maximisation, individual profits for the non-cooperative solution and total profits for the cooperative one. In the present analysis, strategic conflicts arise from the differences between vessels in technical efficiency (catchability coefficient) and economic efficiency (defined here). The ten-year and 1000-iteration stochastic simulations performed for the two effort solutions show that the best strategy from both an economic and a conservationist perspective is homogeneous effort cooperation. However, the results under non-cooperation are more similar to the observed data on effort strategies and landings.

Keywords: effort dynamics, game theory, fisheries bioeconomics, simulation models, red shrimp, Northwestern Mediterranean
Contents of this volume Sci. Mar. 71(3) : 537-550 Back PDF
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